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AbstrACt
In this paper we look at the developmental consequen-
ces of aid flows on the Great Lakes Region in Africa. The reshuffling of 
international relations after the end of the cold war has dramatically 
changed the exogenous influence of external actors on the agency of 
local and regional actors in the developing world. Our main hypoth-
esis is however, that political considerations and donor coordination 
problems still play an important role in directing aid, although in a 
very different fashion compared to the cold war era. The region of the 
Great Lakes in Africa is a good illustration of the « darlings » versus 
« orphans » policy of official development assistance (ODA). Following 
a new selectivity principle, extensive structural aid is only allocated 
to those countries who exhibited a very particular form of “good gov-
ernance” to which donors are sensitive, while “failed states” cannot 
qualify for structural ODA.  This has led to the “aid darling” status of 
Rwanda and the “aid orphan” status of Zaire/DRCongo and Burundi. 
Our contention is that these choices have unduly inflicted high costs 
to these two latter countries and to the region. Since their economies 
are extremely aid dependent, the allocation of aid has a considerable 
impact on economic development as we try to show in this article. De-
parting somewhat from the dominant pessimist stance on the effec-
tiveness of aid in Sub Sahara Africa we will try to show that overall, 
the costs of exclusion are detrimental for economic development and 
create regional and even international public ‘bads’ because of the 
spill-over effects of exclusion on the region. 
Key words: Great Lakes Region, Aid, Political Economy 
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résumé
Dans cet article nous analysons les conséquences, au niveau 
développement, du flux d’aide vers la Région des Grands Lacs en Afrique. 
Suite à la fin de la guerre froide, les relations internationales ont sérieu-
sement modifié l’influence exogène des acteurs externes sur les inter-
ventions des acteurs locaux et régionaux dans le monde en développe-
ment. Cependant notre hypothèse principale est que les considérations 
politiques et les problèmes de coordination entre donateurs continuent 
encore à jouer un rôle important dans l’aide, quoique de façon différente 
comparés à la période de la guerre froide. La région des Grands Lacs en 
Afrique constitue une bonne illustration de la politique officielle de l’aide 
au développement (AOD) aux ‘favoris’ opposés aux ‘orphelins’. Suite à 
l’application d’un nouveau principe de sélection, une aide structurelle 
extensive sera uniquement allouée aux pays qui ont mis en oeuvre une 
politique particulière de ‘ bonne gouvernance’ à laquelle les donateurs 
sont très sensibles, alors que les pays sans ‘bonne gouvernance’ n’obtien-
dront pas d’aide structurelle. Cela nous a conduit vers un statut ‘d’aide 
préférentielle’ au Rwanda et ‘d’aide discriminatoire’ au Zaïre/RDCongo et 
Burundi. Notre appréciation est que ces choix ont injustement infligé des 
coûts élevés à ces deux derniers pays et à la région. Comme leurs écono-
mies sont fort dépendantes de l’aide,  l’allocation de l’aide a un impact 
considérable sur le développement économique comme nous essayons de 
le montrer dans cet article. Partant de l’attitude pessimiste dominante 
sur l’efficacité de l’aide à l’Afrique Subsaharienne, nous allons tenter de 
démontrer que d’une façon générale le coût de l’exclusion se fait toujours 
au détriment du développement économique et crée des « mauvais » au 
niveau régional et international à cause des effets de ‘débordements’ de 
l’exclusion pour la région.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 
	 1.	 IntroduCtIon
Since the beginning of the post-colonial era, aid has always 
been one of the instruments in the Western powers’ panoply of interven-
tions in their former colonies. During the cold war era, the aid flows, mo-
dalties and motives differed along lines of importance in the East-West 
competion. Countries that were considered strategic in geopolitical or 
economic terms received substantial unconditional amounts of aid. Com-
bined with the doctrine of non intervention in internal affairs, political 
elites in developing countries could use these aid flows at their discretion, 
as long as there was unconditional political allegiance to the West. The 
resource rich Zaïre was in Africa, as was Indonesia for Asia and Brasil for 
Latin America, a centrepiece in the counterrevolutionary strategy of the 
cold war era (Gould, 1980). The well known quote by R.Nixon when asked 
why the US was supporting a kleptocratic dictator like Mobutu is illustra-
tive for that period: “I know he is a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a 
bitch”. For all these reasons it might not come as a surprise that aid in 
these countries was not very effective in fostering economic and human 
development. Aid in less strategic countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, 
where governments had less leverage, was more channelled into devel-
opmental activities and could therefore show a better use of ODA flows. 
Although both countries are landlocked and resource poor, income per 
head doubled in the cold war era whilst the inhabitants of the resource 
rich neighbour, Zaire, experienced a decline in its GDP per capita of more 
than 50% during the same period.(Marysse, 2003) 
The flow of aid and its impact however, changed dramati-
cally since the end of the Cold War. The exogenous shocks which African 
countries had to absorb were twofold, and intimately linked. First of all 
donors started to place democratisation and good governance high on 
the agenda. This of course disrupted the political texture of the countries 
and weakened the position of the ruling classes, who lost the access to 
the aid rent. Second, the end of the Cold War1 also brought with it liber-
alisation and opening up of the international markets in countries that 
were not competitive internationally. The national economies increas-
ingly fell back on the informalisation of economy and state, thereby lead-
ing to shrinking budgets and income. The reaction of local and regional 
political actors to this rupture led to increased competiton between elites 
for shrinking rents and political power. This competiton, made possible 
by international demands for more democracy, sparked off civil war in 
Rwanda and Burundi spilling over to Zaire /Congo. Since Zaire was inter-
nally weakened through decades of mismanagement, condoned by the 
international community, the spill-overs set the region in a blaze, leading 
to the “first international African war” (see Reyntjens, 1994, 2004). 
1 This systemic change after the Cold War 
has by and large also been confirmed in the 
empirical aid allocation literature. See espe-
cially Berthélemy and Tichit (2004, section 4) 
for details.    • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
This warp and weft of endogenous and exogenous reac-
tions led to a realignment of positions in the international community 
and consisted in the resumption of aid to Rwanda and almost com-
plete withdrawal from Zaire/Congo and Burundi. Indeed, the isolation 
of the latter countries has been lifted somewhat the last two years. 
Nonetheless, the gap between the promises of aid and the distribution 
of funds in the case of Congo risks disrupting the entire fragile process 
of peace and reconstruction. 
In the next section we try to show how recent theoretical 
and empirical work on rents, aid, effectiveness and selectivity of aid 
offers a framework to understand why countries arrive at the status of 
“aid orphan” or “aid darling”.2 The third section documents the evolu-
tion of aid flows and aid modalities to the three countries after the end 
of the post cold war era. It clearly brings out the exclusion of RDCongo 
and Burundi, strongly contrasting with the preferential treatment of 
Rwanda. The fourth section shows how the aid status of the country 
coincides with its performance in terms of development. Prima facie, 
this is good news for the donor community because the dominant view 
of aid to Africa is that it was not very effective in promoting growth and 
development (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Heller, 2005; Rajan and Sub-
ramanian, 2005). The flip side of this coin is the inability of aid to cope 
with those very low income countries trapped in weak institutions and 
bad governance. As these countries cannot apply for substantial aid, 
they end up in an ‘aid orphan’ status. In that sense the new aid para-
digm produces a vicious circle because of an “aid-institutions dilemma” 
(see Moss et alii, 2006)3 Finally the conclusion will explore how and 
under what conditions this ‘aid-institutions dilemma’ could be lifted in 
view of the historical trajectories of the countries in the region. 
2 This terminology, introduced as a consequence 
of the new selectivity, is explained in McGillivray 
(2006).
3 By ‘Aid Institutions dilemma’ we understand the 
vicious circle created by the new stance on aid se-
lectivity ( Hout, 2004): In order for poor countries 
to apply for structural aid  (in the form of budget 
and sectoral support) you need good governance 
and    therefore  performant  institutions.  This  di-
lemma is akin to the literature on ‘treshold exter-
nalities’, or even ‘poverty traps’ (Kraay and Radd-
atz, 2005). Since most least developed countries 
are  caracterized  by  weak  institutions,  they  are 
trapped in a vicious circle of “aid orphan” status. 
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	 2.	 InstItutons,	rents	And	AId	seleCtIvIty
	 	 In	the	regIon
Each development path is different, through a combination 
of exogenous factors (intervention by external agents) and endogenous 
factors (differing regional and local contexts and agents). This intertwin-
ing of factors creates an unpredictable dynamic for change, which can set 
in motion a virtuous spiral of development or, on the contrary, degenerate 
into regressive human development and even feed into a logic of violence 
and conflict, as was the case in the Region of the Great Lakes in Africa 
(Marysse, 2005). However, how these factors interact in the context of 
Sub Sahara Africa is a matter of intense debate in the literature. 
An important element in this debate is the assumed role and 
effectiveness of Aid to Sub Sahara Africa (SSA). One positive stance in the 
debate argues that aid flows  (ODA) should at least double in comparai-
son with their 2000 level if the targets set by the international community 
is to be reached (Zedillo Panel 2001; Devarajan et al, 2002; Collier 2006). 
Tony Blair, in the framework of the Commission for Africa (2005) made a 
plea for an immediate increase of 25 billion dollar and another 25 billion 
towards 2015. If the Millenium Development Goals have to be reached 
then, following the recommendation of the UN (2005), global ODA should 
attain a level of 195 billion $ by 2015 from their current level of 79 billion $ 
in 2004 (Moss et alii, 2006). The rationale for such an increase is the argu-
ment that a ‘big push’ is necessary to lift these least developed countries 
above a threshold under which institutions cannot perform efficiently 
(Sachs and Warner 1999; Collier 2006).
This positive stance on Aid is countered by a number of au-
thors. There is quite widespread scepticism on the useful absorptive ca-
pacity of ODA flows to Africa, the so called ‘curse of aid’ (Svensson 2003, 
Easterly 2005). If the pledges for increased aid flows to Africa materialize, 
this would imply a threefold increase for countries4 that already received 
more than 10 % of their national income in ODA flows during the last dec-
ades, without substantive improvement in growth and poverty.  
Indeed, the dismal performances of African economies have 
been the source of much debate. There was quite general agreement that 
traditional explanations of growth and improvement of living standards, 
such as lack of natural resources, human or physical capital, etc., was due 
to other factors than purely economic explanations. This phenomenon 
was dubbed “the African dummy” because half of the variation in growth 
performances could not be explained through economic variables (Collier 
and Gunning, 1999; Englebert, 2001). Van de Walle, for example, explains 
the evolution of development in sub-Saharan Africa as “the fruit of the 
marriage of neo-patrimonialism and the international development busi-
4 More than 36 out of the 46 SSA countires 
received ODA in excess of 10% of their na-
tional income, one dozen countries received 
more  than  20  of  their  national  income  in 
ODA.(Moss et alii., 2006)  10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
ness” (Van de Walle, 2001). In other words the dismal performances of 
development in Africa were due to internal political factors, while the 
aid flows that were supposed to lift Africa out of poverty and under de-
velopment, compounded the problem. In fact this finding was nothing 
new to political scientists, who already stressed for a long time that the 
state and the economy were undermined by neo patrimonial policies 
that permeated the whole society (Hyden, 1984), or that sound public 
institutions are a precondition to development (Herbst, 1990; Evans, 
1995). Finally the breakthrough of the importance of good governance 
and the necessity of sound institutions came with the acceptance of 
the views of the New Institutional School (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2003; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Many of these ideas for Africa however 
were anticipated by the seminal work of R. Bates (Bates 1983;1989). 
These views on the necessity of sound institutions had 
their influence on the debate of Aid effectiveness and led to the new 
selectivity criteria that were more and more used by the leading donor 
countries (Hout, 2004). In these views Aid to Africa was ineffective for 
different reasons. First, there was an economic explanation that was 
akin to the discussion of the “Dutch disease” (Heller, 2005; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005).  Aid, was considered a rent; that is an unearned 
income by the ruling elites which leads to negative economic and po-
litical effects. Economically, the “dutch disease” effect leads, through 
the access of easy foreign exchange, to an appreciation of the exchange 
rate and lowers therefore the competitiveness of the economy (Adam 
and Bevan, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Politically, the easy 
money relaxes the budget constraint for the government and there-
fore government expenditure can rise without scrutiny from the public 
or the civil society. In other words the “dutch disease” effect of aid 
lessens the accountability of the government and the ruling elites. 
But there are still other costs that come with aid flows in 
aid intensive countries and that are well documented in the aid litera-
ture (Berg, 1993; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Each donor brings with 
it oversight and coordination costs that overlap and duplicate efforts 
of other donors who compete for scarce competent local staff. Since 
rewards and fringe benefits for scarce local staff are much higher that 
what they could earn by non corrupt behaviour in the national bu-
reaucracies, aid further weakens national institutions. 
These are only a few of the most important “seven deadly 
sins” that are associated with high aid to income ratios typical for SSA 
(see Birdsall, 2004). The description of these costs by Moss et alii gives 
a perfect account of the pernicious effects of aid in the countries of the 
region (2006:9): 
“Projects provide for the allocation of all sorts of discre-IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 11
tionary goods to be politicized and patrimonialized, including four-wheel 
drive cars, scholarship, decisions over where to place schools… The com-
mon practice of paying cash  ‘sitting fees’ for civil servants attending do-
nor-funded workshops, where the daily rates can exceed regular monthly 
salaries, even turns training into a rent to be distributed… Aid depend-
ence thus leads to a situation in which bureaucrats are often not rewarded 
for focusing on their core developmental functions but rather on getting 
money from donors”.
This realistic appraisal on the impact of aid has led many au-
thors to warn against expansion of ODA to those aid-dependant countries. 
This resulted in a new selectivity that has been adopted by leading donor 
agencies and important bilateral donors (Hout, 2004); this shift could 
even labelled as a true paradigm shift (with, of course, its own inherent 
cracks) (Renard, 2006). The main thrust of the new selectivity criterium 
was twofold. First, project aid has many disadvantages for reasons men-
tioned above and a shift in aid instruments towards budget aid and sector 
wide program support in health, education, public enterprises etc. is to be 
preferred. However, and that is the second main characteristic of the new 
selectivity, only those states capable of absorbing these new aid flows in 
a responsible, accountable, and efficient way could apply for these new 
aid flows. 
The argument and policy advice for the new selectivity finds 
its roots in the 1998 World Bank study on assessing aid (World Bank, 
1998):
“Developing countries with sound polcies and high-quality 
public institutions have grown much faster… Put simply failures in poli-
cymaking, institution building and the provision of public services have 
been more severe constraints on development than capital markets… we 
recommend that aid be allocated on the basis of poverty and economic 
management … more finance should go to the countries with the better 
management”
This recommendation holds a fortiori for countries involved 
in conflict and deep crisis which by definition are characterized by weak 
government. It is exactly this new selectivity criterion and the pessimistic 
stance on more aid to Africa that has led to what we call the “aid dilem-
ma”, resulting in the “aid orphan” status of Zaire/Congo and Burundi and 
the “aid darling” status of Rwanda. The heart of the matter in this article 
is of course whether this position on selectivity and the pessimistic stance 
on Aid to Africa in general, while to the Great Lakes Region in particular, 
is valid.
Of course most of the arguments on the possible harmful ef-
fects of aid, spelled out above, have validity. Aid flows, especially if al-12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
located in the form of budget support or program aid, are bound to be 
wasted in the context of failed states. However that proposition does, 
in our opinion, not imply that a lower aid flow is then the unavoidable 
consequence. In this case, it is the modalities of aid that matter. We 
argue that in a context of failed states, international donors should 
consider other forms of aid allocation next to budget aid as the level 
of financial assistance is absolutely too low for these countries. There 
are four arguments to sustain our contention, also illustrated by our 
case studies.
First, the negative stance on more aid to Africa is theo-
retically inspired by the theory on rents. For the purpose of this arti-
cle, suffice to define rents as an income due to rising prices, windfall 
profits or external allocations, accruing to the state or specific interest 
groups (political group, national or international enterprise) without 
any matching effort.5 However there is a very fundamental difference 
between a resource rent such as oil or ‘diamonds’ and an aid-rent. The 
rent accruing to a country through the allocation of foreign aid is al-
ways purposive (Collier, 2006). This rent is accompanied by conditions, 
control mechanisms and is never a free lunch for those in power. Even if 
the criticism on harmful effects of aid is correct, it nevertheless means 
that you can improve its quality.
Second, less aid in the context of a severe crisis - such as 
an internal conflict, war or a failed state - further increases the compe-
tion for the shrinking rents. Information is even more withheld within 
the confines of isolated clientilistic networks and further erodes insti-
tutions that were still functioning. 
Third, the diminished flow, or even radical cancellation 
of aid in certain areas or domains of (regional) public goods such as 
education or health can lead to very high costs and spillovers to other 
domains and countries. Let us take the example of trypanosomiasis in 
DR Congo to illustrate this point. Stopping the fight against sleeping 
sickness has cost a great deal of money because a ‘stop and go’ policy 
in this area is counterproductive. But based on aid-unfavorable argu-
ments (lack of stability and of a democratic government) public aid 
in this area has nonetheless been stopped, even though combatting 
this disease does not require a government or democracy to succeed. 
The whole ‘aid-institutions dilemma’ created by the new selectivity 
rests on the assumption that aid is necessarily and mainly channelled 
through the state and that in circumstances of conflict, only humani-
tarian and emergency aid is possible. In some countries however, such 
as the DRCongo, massive aid in key human development sectors as 
education and health could be channelled through country wide, still 
functioning and trusted institutions such as the churches and NGO’s 
5 This is an adapted definition derived from Sachs 
and  Warner  (1999),  Svensson  (2003)  and  Collier 
(2006) amongst others. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 1
with the explicit partnership, but not command, of local government. In 
a later stage, special funds as advocated by Sachs and Warner (1999) and 
more recently by Collier (2006) have to be taken seriously. Although these 
ideas go back to big push theories advocated in the fifties by authors such 
as F. Perroux and A.O. Hirschman, they have never really be tried in reality. 
It is worthwhile and urgent to explore the feasibility of these proposals. 
Fourth, a climate of security and political stability is seen as a 
vital condition for good governance, which is a criterion trumpeted by the 
international community as crucial in ensuring the effectiveness of aid. In 
1996 these criteria were seen as being fulfilled in Rwanda, but not in Bu-
rundi and Congo. Interestingly, the performance of Rwanda and Burundi 
according to the World Bank’s governance indicators is broadly compara-
ble for that year (see section 4.2 below). Nevertheless, Rwanda benefit-
ted from a large inflow of aid, while Burundi was isolated by an embargo. 
Moreover, the Rwandan experience shows that a climate of political sta-
bility does not automatically lead to a wave of democratisation where the 
interests of the poor are asserted through their representation within po-
litical structures. Over the course of the years, Rwanda has scored points 
in terms of technocratic governance, but has performed less well in terms 
of political indicators such as civil liberties, human rights, independence 
of the justice system, etc. But these arguments seem to carry little weight 
in terms of the way donors act. In their evaluations, they place greater 
emphasis on the technocratic aspects of good governance and thereby 
sidestep the more sensitive, political-type issues. 
Finally, the aid literature has no matching policy or theory for 
“failed states” or conflictuous countries. The vicious circle of weak institu-
tions, economic regress, increasing competition for shrinking rents, vio-
lence, further regress can only be broken if 6 :“the political roots of devel-
opment productively join with the economic when specialists in violence 
realize that they can best survive and prevail by promoting the prosperity 
of their economic base” (Bates, 2001). Is the international community ca-
pable of breaking that vicious circle where there is no state or where mini-
mal state functions and institutions lack, or where the competing groups 
even engage in warfare or violent exclusion? 
The response of the international community is diverse and 
ranges from no intervention at all as is the case in Somalia, to the more 
limited human intervention and emergency typ of aid as was the case in 
RDCongo and Burundi. On the other hand large scale intervention as e.g. 
in Afganistan cannot be called a success, nothwithstanding the injection 
of large intervention funds. So there is no easy answer to it, but the way 
‘the crisis’ is tackled by the international community in the region of the 
Great Lakes, is far from satisfactory and could be improved. 
6 A representative example of this spiral of 
“economic regression” is the development of 
the state copper producer Gecamines. Up to 
1975 it still produced five hundred thousand 
tonnes of copper a year. In the 1990s, annual 
production dropped to five percent of this ca-
pacity, while at the same time the number of 
executives employed and appointed by the 
political classes increased fivefold. Since tax-
es on this nationalised company represented 
up to sixty percent of the national budget at 
the beginning of nationalisation, it is easy to 
see how development became regressive.  1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
In sum, we need no subdivision into aid “orphan” and 
“aid” darlings in the region of the great Lakes in Africa, but a more en-
compassing regional framework. The aid approach should not exclude 
some countries and favour others for new geopolitical considerations 
that are not very well funded. In the next section we will show the ex-
tent of exclusion by the international community. Thereafter, we will 
investigate the consequences of that differential treatment on eco-
nomic development in these countries and the region. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 1
	 3.	 	InCome	from	AId	And	preferentIAl	
	 	 treAtment	
The following analysis is based on the development of differ-
ent categories of external contributions during the period 1990-2005 for 
the three countries of the Great Lakes Region concerned.7 Graph 1 shows 
the development of all net medium and long-term (MLT) flows from of-
ficial donors, i.e. both bilateral and multilateral (including the IMF). This 
covers all official aid in grant form (excluding technical assistance) as well 
as the net flows on (concessional) debt.8 In short, the graph represents 
the net aid received by the beneficiary countries.








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Millions dollars
RDC Rw anda Burundi
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, several years; figures for 2005 are IMF estimates.
The developments over the last fifteen years very clearly 
demonstrate the diverging reality of the net flows in the three countries. 
The rupture of structural cooperation in DRC and Burundi is announced 
by a marked drop in the inflow of official aid. In Rwanda, by contrast, the 
flows triple during the period just after the genocide compared to the situ-
ation at the beginning of the 1990s. Subsequently the flows hover around 
an average of 300 million dollars, a level which is not really structurally 
higher than that before the crisis. Although the DRC attracted a level of 
aid income higher than that of the other two countries before the crisis, 
the annual volume drops to an average of around 100 million dollars for 
a long period before it finally rises in 2002. However, the data in graph 1 
hide the difference in size between the countries. Graph 2 shows the same 
data but this time in terms of net flows of official aid per capita. 
7 These developments are represented in a 
synthetic manner in graphs 6, 7 and 8 and 
table 2. The data used comes from the World 
Bank, mainly taken from the annual report 
Global Development Finance.
8  The  net  flows  on  debt  are  the  new  pay-
ments minus capital amortisation. The latter 
element contains only the capital principal, 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Dollars    
Rw anda Burundi RDC
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, several years; World Bank,
World development indicators, 2006.
This graph illustrates the differing levels of assistance – 
the data confirm that the smaller countries, in structural terms, receive 
more aid per capita.9 Rwanda and Burundi were in a similar position 
– around 30 dollars per capita – before the crisis. In the case of Burundi, 
the rupture translates into a drop of around 10 dollars. During the same 
period, Rwanda received ten times as much aid per capita in 1994-1995, 
and stabilised at a level comparable to that before the crisis. This level 
was still three times that received by Burundi. In recent years, however, 
Burundi has converged towards the same level as Rwanda. DRC’s level 
is structurally lower, with an average of around 15 dollars at the end of 
the Second Republic (1999), and an almost complete cessation during 
the years of transition. In the most recent years, following the death 
of President Laurent Kabila and the implementation of an enhanced 
interim programme (EIP), the Congolese government has been able to 
fulfil the donors’ conditions for aid after a long period of exclusion. The 
level of aid to Congo has not, however, reached even half that received 
by its two neighbouring countries. A hypothetical increase of DRC’s 
per capita aid to the level of that of Rwanda would increase annual net 
aid in absolute terms to around 1.7 billion USD, a level by far depass-
ing absorptive capacity of current aid absorption mechanisms, and for 
which innovative mechanisms would clearly be needed.  
This geopolitical aid effect als masks sometimes profound 
changes in the relative importance of individual donors for a given 
country. For Rwanda, the country with sustained aid flows, it is partic-
ularly outspoken: as table 1 shows, Belgium, Germany and France were 
leading pre-crisis period donors, while, currently, they are replaced as 
leading donors by countries such as the US, UK, the Netherlands.   
9 This positive ‘small country effect’ is well-known 
and commonly agreed-upon in the aid allocation 
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Table 1 : Weight of individual donors in total bilateral official development 





United states 3.7% 24.6%
United Kingdom 0.2% 20.1%
Netherlands 3.7% 10.8%
Others 38.2% 44.42%
Source : OECD/DAC website.
It is clear that Rwanda has been able to avoid a long-term 
rupture in cooperation. First of all, the country profited immediately from 
the exceptional post-genocide assistance, after its good performance in 
technocratic governance terms led to the re-establishment of structural 
aid as part of the post-conflict aid scheme. As early as the second half 
of 1997, Rwanda had re-established its structural relations with the IMF, 
first of all in a “staff-monitoring” programme, followed in 1998 by an En-
hanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme. By contrast, 
Burundi and DRC went through a long period of rupture in the 1990s, and 
it was only from 2001 that structural aid began to resume, starting with 
the reestablishment of normal relations with the IMF. 
However and probably as important as the absolute level of 
the aid flows, is the dimension of conditionality of these aid flows. It is 
exactly the conditionalty that goes with aid that makes a difference with 
natural resource rents, that is unconditional money accruing to govern-
ment. While the aid literature is not very positive on the ability of condi-
tionality to ‘buy reforms’ (World Bank, 1998), on average, conditionality 
succeeds in making the impact of aid be more positive (or less negative) 
than that of say a natural resource windfall (Collier, 2006). The reestab-
lishment of normal relations with the IMF, embedded in some IMF assist-
ance programme (typically a PRGF programme) has traditionally worked 
as a necessary first step for large scale resumption of structural aid by the 
international donor community. These programmes mix both macro-eco-
nomic stabilization measures with more structural adjustment-type of 
policy conditions. IMF programmes have been rather succesfull in realiz-
ing (short-term) ‘stabilization turnarounds’, also in the Great Lakes region, 
such as most typically in the case of DRC (Akitoby, 2004). However, it has 
proven much more difficult to engineer such sustainable turnarounds in 
fields related to long term economic, institutional and political reform 
leading to sustained poverty reduction. This failure has been explicitely 
recognized in designing the new aid paradigm, giving rise to the ‘Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programme/Paper (PRSP)’ as a new modality of con-1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
ditionality. As such, a substantial increase of aid flows is in principle 
made conditional to the development and execution of a high-quality 
PRSP strategy, tackling all country-specific structural bottlenecks to 
development and lasting poverty reduction.10  
The  behaviour  of  the  external  private  sector  follows  a 
completely different logic. The data in table 2 essentially give an over-
view of the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the repatria-
tion of profits in the three countries.
Table 2: Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and repatriation of 
profits (period averages)
Burundi (millions $) 1980 1990-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005
FDI 5 0.8 3 0.5
Repatriation profits 0 4.4 11 10.3
DRC (millions $) 1980 1990-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005
FDI 110 -36.9 44.3 315.3
Repatriation profits 74 0 0 0
Rwanda (millions $) 1980 1990-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005
FDI 16 3.5 5.5 5.8
Repatriation profits 9 3 1 0
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, several years; IMF, Reports, article IV (estimates 2004 
and 2005)
Firstly, we can see that the level of direct foreign invest-
ment and therefore also the level of repatriation of profits in Rwanda 
and Burundi are negligible. This is explained by the fact that these two 
small, land-locked countries have little in the way of economic advan-
tages and natural resources to attract direct foreign investment. Any 
reform based on the idea that development will come from an (interna-
tional) private sector boom would therefore be limited. Given the slim-
ness of the tax base in these two countries, the role of the state in the 
development of public goods and therefore the countries’ dependence 
on international aid remain a factor which needs to be addressed.
By contrast, the development of the DRC figures simul-
taneously show the country’s potential and the huge incidence of cri-
sis. In crisis periods such as those seen following the DRC’s rupture 
with the international community in 1990, DRC not only saw its income 
from aid disappear, but the crisis was considerably amplified by the 
withdrawal and disappearance of private capital. While direct foreign 
investment in Rwanda and Burundi are marginal and therefore not 
greatly affected by crises, the rupture in international aid to DRC after 
1990 further strengthened the climate of disinvestment and the with-
10 Exactly the same conditionality logic is used 
in engineering debt relief, as under e.g. the HIPC 
debt  relief  initiative.  This  explains  also  why  a 
country such as Rwanda could benefit from debt 
relief (as under HIPC) much sooner than Burundi 
or DRC. See e.g. Cassimon (2006) for a detailed 
analysis of the divergent debt relief practice for 
the three countries concerned.  IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 1
drawal of capital. But as soon as international donors’ confidence was 
restored somewhat (in the last two years), the international private sec-
tor was once again attracted by the natural resources of this potentially 
rich (but currently poor) country. In summary, we can see that private and 
public flows reinforce one another in both positive and negative directions, 
and this may be an idea which donors should analyse in more depth. 
Finally, graph 3 presents the developments in aggregate to-
tals. This concept covers all of the net flows, both official and private, cor-
rected (downwards) for all of the interest payments made and the repa-
triations of profits carried out by foreign investors. The concept presented 
here is not limited to transfers carried out through medium or long-term 
(MLT) borrowing and investments, as in graphs 1 and 2, but instead also 
includes all short-term flows. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, the net 
aggregate transfers carried out are almost entirely determined by the of-
ficial net flows. There is hardly any impact at all on the final result from 
interest payments, DFI and other forms of private sector support. This 
is not the case for DRC; there interest payments, DFI (including repatria-
tion of profits) and other forms of private sector support, and short-term 
transactions do have an impact on the net transfer, which even translates 
into slight negative net aggregate transfers in some years. In those years, 
the country becomes poorer both relatively and absolutely, which is also 
reflected in the economic regression observed during that period.
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	 4.	 eConomIC	development,	good	governAnCe,	And		
	 	 	 poverty	reduCtIon	In	the	greAt	lAkes	regIon			
In this part we see how differential incomes from aid have 
corresponded with diverging paths of economic development for all 
three countries. Further, we look into the main reason raised by in-
ternational donors to explain the differential treatment of the three 
recipient countries: “good governance”, seen as a prerequisite for as-
suring that aid will translate into economic development and poverty 
reduction.
   4.1  Economic development in the three countries
In the next graph 4 and table 3 below, we can see the 
extent to which the end of the Cold War coincides with a rupture in 
the economic development of the three countries in the region. This is 
clearly reflected in the drop in income per capita which we observe from 
1990 onwards. However, the divergences between the three countries 
demonstrate the extent to which endogenous and exogenous factors 
are intertwined. Remarkably, in all three countries the resumption of 
foreign aid goes hand in hand with an upturn in growth. 
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Table 3: Development of real growth and inflation
Rwanda (%) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Inflation  1.0 4.2 19.6 9.6 12.4 64.0 48.2 13.4 11.7
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Inflation  6.8 -2.4 3.9 3.4 2.0 7.4 12.0 7.0 4.0
Burundi (%) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Inflation  11.7 7.0 9.0 1.8 9.7 14.9 19.3 26.4 31.1
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Inflation  12.5 3.4 24.3 9.3 -1.3 10.7 8.0 16.3 7.8
DRC (%) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Inflation  104.1 81.3 2154.4 4129.2 1893.1 23760.5 541.8 617.0 199.0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Inflation  107.0 270.0 553.7 357.0 25.3 12.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, several years;
Zaire/Congo saw the greatest economic regression in the 
first few years of the “Third Republic”, that is, following the end of the 
single party system. Mobutu attempted to sustain his power using all 
available means. He divided the political classes, allowed soldiers to pil-
lage on a large scale and emptied the state treasury. The Mobutu regime 
finally criminalised the state by using the mint to print “real false” cur-
rency. Akitoby describes how due to “the drop in revenue and the surg-
ing of expenditure, the government cash deficit reached extremely high 
levels. In the absence of external borrowing options, recourse was taken 
to central bank credit to fiancé the budget. As a result, the government 
accounted for the bulk of the increase in money.” (Akitoby, 2004:227) This 
practice resulted in world-record hyperinflation and primarily affected 
the poor, who were unable to protect themselves against this institution-
alised theft. Note also that the years which coincide with the First Congo 
War (1996-1997) and the first international African war (1998-2003) are 
not only the years where the economic regression was at its height. It 
were the final Mobutu (Third Republic) years that are marked by the most 
problematic figures, both in terms of economic contraction and inflation. 
It is however with the accession to power of the younger Kabila, after the 
murder on his father, that diplomatic relations were somewhat restored 
and international aid was resumed. This evolution coincided with a slight 
upturn in GDP per capita, a first sign of a Congo that had hopefully hit its 
rock bottom of economic regression. 22 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
On the other hand, Rwanda and Burundi shared a period 
of crisis and economic regression against a backdrop of instability 
and violence at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, from 1994 
onwards their paths are very different. They illustrate how internal 
developments on top of exogenous factors produce very different eco-
nomic results. Burundi saw a slow regression which corresponded to a 
long period of political instability and civil war where the country was 
ignored by the international community. It is not until several years 
after the end of the embargo on international aid (1998) that there was 
a slight upturn in GDP. 
Rwanda saw its most spectacular drop in GDP figures 
with the radical and dramatic rupture caused by the genocide in 1994. 
Subsequently there is a marked upturn in GDP per capita, a phenom-
enon which is often associated in the literature with post-conflict pe-
riods (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). An important question is how-
ever up to which extent this growth is largely aid-induced. The danger 
exists that the inflow of externally financed funds hides the lack of a 
real increase in economic productivity and surmounting of structural 
limitations to increased production. The first signs of this might be 
appearing the last few years (2003-2005), as growth did not comply 
with projections of around 6%. In 2003, the Rwandan growth track 
stagnated, mainly due to rain shortage and a severe output collapse in 
the agricultural sector. In 2004, food price increases, growing energy 
prices and the resulting inflation problem, again tempered economic 
growth from 6% projections to 4% reality. In 2005, economic perform-
ance again improved. But in 2006, bad weather conditions resulted in 
severe food shortage for some regions which have again pushed down 
projections to about 3%. (IMF, 2006) This recent trend illustrates the 
vulnerability  of  Rwanda’s  economy  to  structural  limitations,  being 
confronted with a combination of overpopulation, resource scarcity 
and a limited potential for economic diversification away from subsist-
ence agriculture. Also for the coming years, overall growth targets are 
lowered from originally 6% to projections between 4 and 4.5%. This 
would temper per capita growth to a quite modest 1.1 - 1.6%;11 far below 
the 4 to 5% per capita growth portrayed as ideal in the first PRSP docu-
ment. An important question arising from this is whether growth will 
be substantial and sustainable in the near future. 
In order to measure the relative poverty of a country in 
comparison to the rest of the world, we can refer to the three coun-
tries’ exchange rates. It is again DRC that is confronted with the most 
problematic situation. The loss of international purchasing power with 
the hyperinflation of 1993-1996 was extreme. But also during the first 
international African war (1998-2003) the relative impoverishment of 
Congo is so high that it is by no means comparable to the figures of 
11 Per capita growth rate based on overall GDP 
growth rate and continued population growth of 
around 2.86 % (2000-2002 average).IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 2
Rwanda and Burundi. The inflations speed of Rwanda and Burundi on the 
other hand, is largely comparable. Since Burundi did not receive much 
international aid and therefore benefited from less currency inflow than 
Rwanda, we would expect a much greater devaluation of its currency than 
Rwanda. This is not the case, which means that Burundi has been making 
greater efforts of its own. 
The budgetary balance gives a more in-depth view on the 
efforts made by a country and the role played by foreign aid to ensure 
economic development. Graph 5 is noteworthy on more than one score. 
Firstly,  Rwanda  received  considerable  support  from  the  international 
community, with the exception of the year 1994. This aid almost doubled 
after the genocide. On the other hand, if aid flows are not taken into ac-
count, the budgetary deficits in Rwanda are considerably higher than in 
the other two countries. So it is only when donations are included that 
Rwanda’s performance in terms of budgetary balance is better. The im-
proved governance of the current government in terms of budgetary con-
trol is therefore illusory. Also for Congo and Burundi, we can see that when 
aid is put in place, such as over the last few years, the budgetary picture 
changes considerably. If all other things are equal, aid can be considered 
as international public revenues which enable a country to spend more in 
real terms. 
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, several years; World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 2006.
When  analysing  external  imbalances  in  these  three  coun-
tries, the same picture appears (see Graph 6). First, Rwanda is capable of 
importing more than it exports; in other words, international community 
finances allow Rwanda to live beyond its internal means. Burundi, by con-
trast, had much smaller deficits up to 2004, not because exports were 
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of access to international finances. On the other hand, Congo is the 
only country which is capable of generating a trade surplus. This dem-
onstrates the difference in terms of natural resources: while Rwanda 
and Burundi are incapable of independently generating a surplus from 
their poor resources, DRC can do so. Graphs 5 and 6 also illustrate that 
a large country naturally has a tendency to receive relatively less aid, 
certainly when recalculated in per capita terms. This persists even af-
ter the end of DR Congo’s international isolation. 
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Surplus / Deficit of trade balance Grants
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, several years; World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 2006.
The analysis above illustrates how aid did play a role in the 
diverging economic performances of the three countries. While Rwan-
da benefited from substantial aid and realised considerable economic 
progress, Congo and Burundi were largely isolated and economic de-
velopment was disappointing. The argument for excluding countries 
from aid or discriminating between countries has been justified on the 
basis of higher aid effectiveness in some (Rwanda) and less aid effec-
tiveness in other countries (Burundi and Zaire/Congo). However, the 
question remains whether the three Great Lakes countries were after 
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   4.2.  “Good governance” in the three countries.
In the new aid paradigm, the credibility of a country to ensure 
aid effectiveness is based on good governance criteria. By the end nine-
ties, two influential papers (Burnside and Dollar, 2000 - first appeared in 
1997; World Bank, 1998) looked at the link between aid effectiveness and 
good governance. They highlighted the importance of good policy mak-
ing and institutional capacity as important elements in decisions on aid 
allocation. 
However,  there  seems  to  be  ambiguity  about  the  exact 
meaning of good governance. Hout (2004) differentiates between on the 
one hand the technocratic approach to governance and on the other hand 
the political approach to governance. Technocratic governance focuses on 
the way in which the public sector is managed, while political governance 
relates to “the way in which the political and legal system of developing 
countries is organised”. Combining elements from different authors (Left-
wich, 1994; Hoebink 2001),12 Hout enumerates what characterises each 
type of governance, as summarized in the following table 4.





Accountability of government officials Human rights and political liberties
Legality: laws providing predictability for 
the public sector The nature of the political regime
Availability of information about 
government policies Freedom of press
Transparency Ability of civil society to organise
Source: Hout (2004, p.610).
In decisions on allocating aid, donors tend to refer to tech-
nocratic elements of governance rather than to political sensitivities. An 
illustration of this is the general message of the World Bank “Assessing 
aid” report, strongly highlighting the importance of sound management 
for aid to have more impact. Good management is linked to policies that 
result in low inflation, no large fiscal imbalances, and an open trade re-
gime. Institutional quality involves measuring the strength of the rule of 
law, the quality of public bureaucracy, and the pervasiveness of corrup-
tion. (World Bank, 1998:12) 
In  order  to  see  how  the  three  Great  Lakes  countries  per-
form with respect to several dimensions of good governance, we used 
the Kauffmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi governance indicators (2005), see 
12 See e.g. Leftwich (1994); Hoebink (2001). 26 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
table 5. We represent the data in the form of a ‘diamond’,13 see graph 
7. The reference values 0 and 1 in the ‘diamond’ indicate respectively 
the worst-case scenario in sub-Saharan Africa (year 2000) and the sub-
Saharan average (year 2000). The black ‘diamonds’ indicate the aver-
age performance of sub-Saharan Africa. The grey ‘diamonds’ show the 
performance of the specific countries, which can be used to analyse (1) 
an individual country, (2) relative performance between countries and 
with the sub-Saharan average, and (3) relative performance over time. 
Table 5:  A classification of elements of governance according to
donorsensitivity  
Aspects of governance to which 
international donors are 
more sensitive
Aspects of  governance to which 
international donors are 
less sensitive
GE Government effectiveness VA Voice and accountability
RB Regulatory burden
CC Control of corruption
RL Rule of law
 PS Political stability (?)
Source: authors’ reclassification of Kaufmann et alii. (2005) indicators.
Two important issues appear from graph 7. First, Rwanda 
is clearly good at performing well in those domains of governance to 
which international donors are sensitive. Government effectiveness, 
the regulatory burden, control of corruption, and the rule of law are 
four indicators that all relate to the highly valued “institutional quality” 
the World Bank defined as a basic requirement for good management 
and aid effectiveness. These indicators can be found at the up – right 
– down-side of the ‘diamonds’. Over the years, the right-hand side of its 
‘diamonds’ frequently surpasses the Sub-Saharan average. On the oth-
er hand, Rwanda performs far below the Sub-Saharan standard when 
it comes to “voice and accountability”. This is confirmed by other re-
search of Renard and Molenaers stating:
“On the technocratic level, the Rwandan government is 
engaged in serious reforms […] The willingness of the Rwanda govern-
ment to account to donors in the technocratic sense is good. […] On 
the political level, less willingness to be accountable to donors can be 
found. Illustrative is the protracted involvement (1996-2002) of Rwan-
da in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and how the gov-
ernment strongly resisted donor pressure to withdraw.” (Renard and 
Molenaers, 2003:17-18)
13 The reference values 0 and 1 in the ‘diamond’ 
indicate respectively the worst-case scenario in 
sub-Saharan Africa (year 2000) and the sub-Saha-
ran average (year 2000). For the three countries in 
question and the sub-Saharan average, the indi-
cators are therefore indexed with reference to the 
year 2000. We took the year 2000 as a reference 
point for all the ‘diamonds’ in order to have a fixed 
basis for comparison and to allow the ‘diamonds’ 
to be evaluated with respect to time. Where data 
was  not  available,  the  value  for  the  country  in 
question from the previous or subsequent year is 
indicated in order to avoid a situation where the 
shape of the ‘diamond’ is distorted by the absence 
of a value. The black ‘diamonds’ indicate the aver-
age performance of sub-Saharan Africa. For the 
year 2000, this ‘diamond’ corresponds exactly to 
the unit ‘diamond’ (each index is equal to 1). For 
the  other  years,  the  black  ‘diamond’  indicates 
how the sub-Saharan average develops with re-
spect to the year 2000. The grey ‘diamonds’ show 
the performance of the specific countries, which 
can be used to analyse (1) an individual country, 
(2) relative performance between countries and 
with  the  sub-Saharan  average,  and  (3)  relative 
performance over time. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 2
Taking into account the considerable amounts of aid received 
by Rwanda over the second half of the nineties, it is clear that political 
aspects of governance (such as “voice and accountability” or “political 
stability” in this case in DRC) have counted less in decisions on aid alloca-
tion.14 
A second issue is whether aid-darling Rwanda did perform 
so much better in terms of “good governance” compared to the other two 
aid-orphan countries. A noticeable aspect is the strong resemblance be-
tween the governance ‘diamonds’ for Rwanda and Burundi in 1996 and 
1998.  Nonetheless,  Burundi  was  an  international  pariah  during  those 
years, while Rwanda profited from large post-genocide aid allocations. 
This comparative perspective suggests that there was little reason for de-
priving Burundi from international financing. Congo on the other hand did 
perform very poorly on all governance dimensions. The deterioration of 
the state, which went hand in hand with the economic regression and iso-
lation of Zaire/Congo from 1990 to 2002, obviously translates into lamen-
table performance indicators in terms of governance. On the other hand, 
Congo disposes of networks parallel to the state, able to take over impor-
tant aspects of public service delivery (health, education) in an efficient 
and accountable way. Allocating substantial aid through these networks 
was however not seen as a viable option by international donors. This il-
lustrates the weakness of emphasising the central role of the state in aid 
allocation, especially in countries with a weak state.
14 This statement should be somewhat nu-
anced given that some donors (often referred 
to as the “old donors”) did abandon giving 
budgetary aid on the basis of criteria related 
to political freedom. Other donors (often re-
ferred to as “new donors”) took however the 
technocratic accountability of the Rwandan 
government as an important guarantee for 
aid effectiveness.2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10


















































































































































 * Data for CC (Control of Corruption) not available, value imputed 
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   4.3.  Does aid pay off?
The  question  remains  whether  good  technocratic  govern-
ance does ensure aid effectiveness by resulting in rapid development and 
poverty reduction. Our previous analysis suggests that aid did indeed pay 
off for Rwanda in terms of growth figures and better economic perform-
ance. However, as mentioned, there is a high risk that this growth is not 
underpinned by increasing productivity in the rural and other sectors. An-
other issue is then whether this growth translated into substantial pov-
erty reduction. 
Rwanda indeed has an important poverty problem. On the 
basis of the following table, 60.3% of the population is poor, among which 
two third are extreme poor (living under the food poverty line). The pov-
erty line used here is country specific. If one would have used the interna-
tional poverty line of 1$ per day, poverty incidence would be even higher. 
Poverty is a largely rural phenomenon. 97.5% of the poor and 98.5% of 
the extreme poor live in the countryside. Also severity of poverty is more 
problematic in rural areas.
Table 6: Poverty in Rwanda
Poverty line 1 = 
64.000 frw (ae)
per year
Poverty line 2 = 
45.000 frw (ae)
per year 
Population share P0 P0
Kigali urban 7,4% 12,3% 4,5%
Other urban 3,0% 19,4% 9,8%
Rural  89,5% 65,7% 45,8%
Total 100,0% 60,3% 41,6%
Source: Minecofin, 2002A; Minecofin, 2002B.
Remarks:
(1) Poverty line 1 corresponds with 164$ per year per adult 
equivalent and lies below the international poverty line of 1$ a day per 
adult equivalent. This countryspecific poverty line corresponds to the 
cost of the minimal basic needs (food and others), and was determined by 
the Rwandan government. 
(2) Poverty line 2 corresponds with 115$ per year per adult 
equivalent. This “food poverty line” is equivalent the cost of a food basket 
of minimum 2500 kcal per adult per day.
To determine whether and to which extent strong post-con-
flict economic growth was for the benefit of the poor, we should com-
pare Rwanda’s growth elasticity of poverty with cross-country averages. 
Different research sources conclude to an average growth elasticity of 0 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
poverty within the interval -2.0 and -3.0. This implies that a positive 
(or negative) economic growth rate of 1% should lead to a 2% - 3% 
decrease (or increase) of poverty in percentage terms, (World Bank, 
2000; Ravallion, 2001; Adams, 2004). When considering the Rwandan 
post-war experience, there seems little reason for much optimism. A 
strong Rwandan growth corresponds with limited poverty reduction, 
much less in comparison to cross-country averages. An elasticity of -
0.37 (for period 1994-2000) implies that each percentage of economic 
growth only led to a disappointing 0.37% decrease in poverty incidence, 
(Ansoms, 2005). 
Table 7: Growth elasticity of poverty (Rwanda)
1994-2000
% change in poverty incidence -17.61%
% change in GDP per head (cst LCU) 47.32%
Poverty Elasticity -0.37
Source: Ansoms, A., 2005.
The Rwandan case, with its disappointing derived effect 
of  post-conflict  growth  on  poverty  incidence,  thus  illustrates  that 
good technocratic governance is no automatic guarantee for translat-
ing aid-induced economic growth into pro-poor development.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 1
	 5.	 	by	wAy	of	ConClusIon
The differential treatment of the countries of the Great Lakes 
region in the post-Cold War period goes hand-in-hand, or coincides, with 
improved economic development for the ‘darling’ of the region (Rwanda) 
and economic regression for the ‘orphans’ of the region (Burundi and DR 
Congo). It is only in the last few years that this imbalance on the part of 
the international community has begun to change. The observation made 
here raises various questions and comments.
First of all, is this just a coincidence, or is it causality? In order 
to prove systematically that the exogenous factor i.e. aid, makes a differ-
ence to the economic development performances of the countries, the in-
ternal/endogenous factors would have to be directly comparable. This is 
always problematic outside of laboratory conditions. However, although 
the question of coincidence or cause is difficult to prove, there are still 
various reasons to suppose at least partial causality. 
We can certainly say that it is difficult to compare Congo, 
with its rich potential in terms of natural resources but failing state mech-
anisms, with countries like Rwanda (but also Burundi), which is a small, 
land-locked country with few natural resources and developmental ad-
vantages but has a tradition of better performance in terms of techno-
cratic governance. The international community and donors trumpet the 
superior governance in Rwanda to justify a higher level of aid intervention. 
Although this argument might hold up in differentiating between Congo 
and Rwanda, it is more problematic when it comes to Rwanda versus Bu-
rundi. As we have seen in this article, the governance indicators for the 
two countries were broadly comparable. Moreover, the two countries 
have very similar internal characteristics in terms of sociological hetero-
geneity and material resources. The two countries are also both highly 
dependent on aid as their sole external resource. As we have seen, other 
financial flows such as direct foreign investment play a very marginal 
role in the development of the two countries. Given these conditions, it 
is therefore not particularly surprising that the ‘darling’ country, which 
receives aid to the tune of half of its national budget, performs better in 
terms of eonomic development.
Another argument used in the international community for 
this discrimination in terms of aid is that of political stability and the need 
for a minimum level of security in order for aid to be effective. Thus the 
increase in aid to Rwanda corresponded to the post-conflict and post-
genocide period, while Congo and Burundi were still in a phase of conflict 
and therefore could not receive the same level of aid. But this argument is 
also shaky in various respects. First, the reasoning according to which aid 
cannot be given to countries in conflict is unconvincing. More than half of 2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
Congolese territory was in government hands, and even if there were 
doubts as to the capacity for governance of Laurent Kabila’s govern-
ment, or the Burundian government, use could have been made of civil 
society channels, which were still working and trustworthy in these 
countries. The increase in aid to Rwanda after the genocide was much 
more substantial than the level of aid granted to Congo and Burundi in 
their current post-conflict phase. Moreover, although Congo and Bu-
rundi were not involved in the civil war and the subsequent genocide in 
Rwanda, Rwanda exported its problems to Congo and also, to a lesser 
extent, to Burundi. Millions of refugees were trapped in the territories 
of the neighbouring countries, and Rwanda together with Uganda trig-
gered war on two occasions on Congolese soil, at the cost of millions 
of lives.15 
In sum, a few conclusions emerge from this discussion. 
First, the good news for the international community is that interna-
tional aid can certainly make a difference to the development perform-
ance in countries which are highly dependent on aid, as is shown by 
the cases of Rwanda and Burundi. The bad news is that the differen-
tial treatment of the countries of the Great Lakes region of Africa is 
not based on international good governance criteria, but rather stems 
from political motivations, which are often well-intentioned, as after 
the Rwandan genocide, but not particularly comprehensible or effec-
tive in promoting development in the region. 
However, thanks to the voluntarism of actors within in-
ternational organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, this 
situation seems to have redressed itself somewhat in the data from 
the last few years. There is nonetheless currently a very worrying gap 
between the promises of aid to DR Congo made in Brussels in Febru-
ary 2006 and the payments actually being made. The promised funds 
were supposed to finance initiatives to guarantee the peace during the 
elections and in the reconstruction phase and they are indispensable 
in consolidating peace in the region. There is a substantial risk that 
DR Congo will continue to be an aid ‘orphan’, but more than that: the 
human cost of any complete disintegration of the region due to inad-
equate aid would be incalculable. Therefore we could only strongly 
support the plea that has been made by Collier (2006) for new aid in-
struments in the context of weak governance or failed states. Indeed 
the assumption by the new aid paradigm and its selectivity criterium 
that only states with strong governance can usefully absorb huge aid 
flows needs to be revised. This plea by Collier is not new and is based 
on the theory of the “Big Push” that was advocated half a century ago. 
The rationale behind the idea is that failed states are characterised 
by ‘treshold externalities’ and that it needs to build up its institutions 
such as an effective army, a trustworthy civil service, a minimal infra-
15 According to estimates from the International 
Rescue  Committee,  around  3.5  million  people 
have directly or indirectly lost their lives in the 
wars in Congo.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10 • 
structure, etc. This is an enormous challenge for the international com-
munity because there is not much experience with “big pushes”. Many 
questions arise within this context. What kind of conditionality has to go 
with these new flows? Can countries accept a loss of sovereignty if the 
international community will partly have to substitute for the weakness 
in governance? However, many lessons in Aid delivery have been learnt 
and the international community is freed from the ambiguous past of the 
cold war geopolitics, so may be the challenge for a better future for these 
poverty stricken regions is more feasible than in the past. 
Finally, one of the structural problems in multilateral and 
bilateral organisations is that these donors’ instruments are organised 
around policies and solutions on a ‘country by country’ basis. Decisions 
are made separately rather than in a coherent fashion for the whole re-
gion, and what is lacking, therefore, is a clear view of the implications of 
this approach at regional level. • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-10
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